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The anthropophagic organization: 
How innovations transcend the temporary in a Project-Based 
Organization 
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Jonathan Sapsed 
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Abstract 
 
This article shows how innovations in projects may be diffused successfully within 
a large Project-Based Organization (PBO) and how they ‘live on’ through their 
adaptation. We draw on the metaphorical notion of anthropophagy, literally 
‘human cannibalism’, which is used to explain the appropriation of otherness 
resulting in ongoing organizational life. Prior organization literature has stressed 
the difficulties of the transition from the temporary to the permanent, especially 
the failure of database-oriented approaches, and argued that these barriers may be 
overcome with repeatable standardized templates. In contrast we show that 
multiple innovations may be adopted within the same PBO, which manifest as 
differentiated, combined forms. Cases in the large energy and engineering 
company, Petrobras, show a systematic innovation process involving subject 
experts, but centrally a database containing records of 1104 mandatory and 
discretionary innovations.  The article analyses these data, process documentation 
and observation of 15 completed innovation projects. The article argues that in 
addition to technical factors the anthropophagic attitude motivates adopters to 
take on the innovations of others with the appetising prospect of appropriation 
and adaptation.  
 
Key words: project-based organization, innovation, knowledge transfer, temporary 
organizations, boundary objects, anthropophagy 
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Introduction 
 
When in eternal lines to time thou grow'st,      
So long as men can breathe, or eyes can see,      
So long lives this, and this gives life to thee. 
 
William Shakespeare, Sonnet 18. 
 
What stimulates an appetite for innovation? From projects to organizations, the 
transfer of the ephemeral innovation to the permanent practice is said to be 
difficult (Hobday, 2000; Scarbrough et al., 2004; Davies and Brady, 2015). This view 
has emerged from a widespread perceived failure of technical approaches, where 
‘lessons learned’ and ’post project reviews’ information is stored in databases, 
intranets and other collaborative software (Newell et al., 2001; Newell et al., 2006; 
McDermott, 1999). These artifacts that are developed to serve as boundary objects 
(Carlile, 2002; Sapsed and Salter, 2004) with the promise of knowledge capture 
and transfer have been disappointing in their results, and effective boundary 
objects have only been temporarily so (Sapsed and Salter, 2004). Where project to 
business learning is reported to have occurred it has done so through ‘repeatable 
solutions’ (Davies and Brady, 2000; Brady and Davies, 2004), standardized 
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processes that follow a somewhat linear diffusion path of singular innovations. 
This is effectively a ‘roll-out’ of successful project outcomes. 
 
This ‘copy exactly’ approach is quite different to the adaptation and modification of 
innovations observed by Boland et al. (2007), who use the metaphor of ‘waves’ and 
‘wakes’ of heterogeneous innovations that manifest in differing trajectories and 
forms. In Boland et al.’s study the organizations that had produced this 
heterogeneity all had worked temporarily with the Gehry architectural practice, 
they were exposed to new techniques and knowledge and took these forward 
through multiple idiosyncratic paths in their own firms and projects. Technologies 
indeed worked as boundary objects in facilitating the process. 
 
Our guiding question in this paper is whether this same effect is possible in the 
same Project-Based Organization (PBO), rather than inter-firm diaspora, and 
through what processes and conditions is this achieved? In this paper we present 
findings that differentiated innovations, transferred and transformed within its 
parts, do indeed occur in the same organization via projects and the processes that 
we will outline, and that these in effect prolong their life. Innovations that we might 
expect to be applied and forgotten continue to live on in the permanent 
organization, we believe by virtue of this adaptive ability. Our evidence here is 
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drawn from an organization in a less-studied country, Brazil, an emerging economy 
that nevertheless boasts one of the world’s largest energy companies, Petrobras, a 
typical PBO, renowned for advanced engineering and innovations in cutting-edge 
areas such as deep drilling and extraction. We find in Petrobras successes in 
transfer of innovations and use of databases that contrast with the negative lessons 
of the studies in the prior literature. 
 
How was this achieved? We argue that there are three requirements (1) apposite 
organizational processes, involving subject experts, and senior management 
decision-making (2) data, in spite of the disappointment in the literature we find 
and explain how database usage is determining in our case, but finally and 
importantly (3) anthropophagy, an attitude and behavior that motivates the 
adoption and adaptation of innovations originated elsewhere. Anthropophagy, 
literally ‘human cannibalism’, is a metaphor long established in the humanities to 
represent a Brazilian cultural proclivity to enthusiastically take on ideas and living 
resources from notional others. However, while taken on, the ideas are also 
reconfigured and transformed. There is a duality of openness but also defense to 
‘alien’ ideas in the creation of new forms that reflect contributions from both 
transferors and transferees. While this attitude is not restricted to Brazil we find it 
contains clues to the puzzles of project-to- business transfer and the temporary to 
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the permanent. Like Shakespeare’s ‘eternal lines’ alluded to in his 18th sonnet, 
database entries are bound to time and only grow with interaction to living users. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: we first review existing research on the 
learning paradox of PBOs and its possible solutions, the perceived problems with 
IT artifacts and database approaches, then motivation and the literature on 
anthropophagy. We then discuss the data and methods for the research, followed 
by the case study section, which describes the analysed data in the form of the 
innovation process and a nested case-within-the-case study. We then analyse the 
implications of these for the literature in the Discussion section, followed by the 
Conclusions. 
 
The learning paradox of PBOs and its possible solutions 
 
Interest in PBOs has grown in the past decades (DeFillippi and Arthur, 1998; 
Hobday, 2000; Gann and Salter, 2000; Keegan and Turner, 2002; Lindkvist, 2004; 
Sydow et al., 2004; Blindenbach-Driessen and Van den Ende, 2006; Davies and 
Brady, 2015; Lundin et al., 2015). PBOs are organizational forms that create 
temporary arrangements and systems through which firms provide services to 
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their clients, developing customized projects, such as engineering, construction 
and systems development firms, and consultancies. These may be consortia that 
exist to service a specific project and are then disbanded (Hobday, 2000) or they 
may be firms that consistently organise their operations through projects, but are 
anchored to a permanent centre. This paper focuses on this latter type.  
 
The PBO seems to offer positive conditions both for creating new knowledge and to 
foster creativity and innovation: often involving autonomous and multidisciplinary 
teams; holding less cumbersome hierarchy; and able to find solutions in a short 
and intensive period of time (Sydow et al., 2004; Bakker et al., 2013). PBOs achieve 
innovations as they create and re-create organizational structures depending on 
the demands of each project (Hobday, 2000). 
 
Yet the temporary nature of projects raises tensions and questions (Janowicz-
Panjaitan et al., 2009; Bakker, 2010). In spite of the innovative advantages of 
project organisation the PBO form also has disadvantages in capturing innovations 
and learning from project to project (Hobday, 2000; Scarbrough et al., 2004). The 
PBO has an internal diffusion problem, often leaking the benefits of innovation and 
new knowledge, which flow more easily through communities of practice that 
extend beyond, rather than within firm boundaries (Brown and Duguid, 2001; 
 7 
Lindkvist, 2005). 
 
PBOs face a recurring tension between the always-immediate demands of the 
project and the opportunities for learning and disseminating best practices and 
innovations (Sydow et al., 2004). To make the temporary aspects of a project 
become part of a permanent learning process for the organization, Davies and 
Brady (2000) argue that managers need to understand ‘economies of repetition’. To 
learn from projects organisations undertake some patterns of activities that can be 
predictable and repeatable, leading to a more efficient and effective performance. 
This means that in PBOs, economies result more from this repetition of similar 
types of projects than from scale or scope. In a related paper, Brady and Davis 
(2004) discussed two modes of learning: the project-driven and the business-led 
mode. In the project-driven learning, knowledge transfer occurs across projects 
and within the organization as a whole. In the business-led learning, the senior 
management, responsible for organizational changes and the overall strategy, must 
be fed-back with important project-based learning to refine and extend the firm's 
capabilities and routines (Brady and Davis, 2004). The trick here is to 
operationalize ‘repeatable solutions’ so that successful innovations in a project 
may be re-enacted throughout the organization in multiple contexts. Similarly to 
the observations of Winter and Szulanski (2001) on consumer and leisure service 
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business chains and franchises this entails ‘replication’ and the desire to ‘copy 
exactly’ (Szulanski and Winter, 2002) or ‘drag and drop’ (Sapsed and Salter, 2008).   
 
In a sense this standardized model of innovation ‘roll-out’ is akin to diffusion of 
innovations in consumer markets (Rogers, 1995) or diffused adoption of singular 
technologies and processes within similar organisations (Cooper and Zmud, 1990;  
Fichman and Kemerer, 1997).  However Boland et al. (2007) observe different 
dynamics in the case of architect Frank Gehry’s projects, where exposure to 
innovations in design engineering and construction had led the architecture 
practice’s collaborators to not only learn and repeat, but to go further. Boland et al. 
report that the diffusion dynamics are more akin to ‘waves’ and subsequent ‘wakes’ 
of innovative activity. Innovations performed in these wakes are differentiated, 
modified and reconfigured versions of the originals. Rather than a linear ‘rolling-
out’ of homogenised innovation templates the trajectories instead follow multiple 
paths. These are naturally occurring and spontaneous in that people in 
organisations that were exposed to the original innovations find principles, 
techniques, resources or heuristics in them that prove useful to solve problems in 
new contexts.  
 
However while Boland et al. observe this effect in distinctive project partner firms 
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it is not clear whether this same differentiated wave effect may be observed, or 
even produced in the same PBO? Can the adaptive wave effect be effectively 
managed into being and what conditions enable it? Our empirical study is 
motivated by these issues, which is guided by the following research questions: 
 
 How are innovations transferred within a large Project-Based 
Organization? Specifically how are they identified and through what 
processes are they diffused? 
 How do innovations manifest in their adoption? 
 
Following these questions we turn to the literature on the use of IT and the notion 
of boundary objects in PBOs, since there is debate over the role of these IT objects 
in the type of knowledge transfer we have been discussing. 
 
 
IT artifacts and database approaches 
 
Because of PBOs’ difficulties in project-to-project learning, many organisations 
have implemented activities to convert tacit knowledge into codified knowledge 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), potentially transforming the temporary into the 
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permanent. A common strategy used is to hold post-hoc project review processes 
and try to capture and codify this knowledge into a database to make it available 
for other project teams. Usually, in large firms, these databases are computerised 
and there is a corporate intranet to facilitate the access. With this facility it is 
expected that knowledge be shared across projects (Kotnour, 1999; Sharp, 2003). 
However this strategy’s effectiveness has been challenged by literature. Critics 
argue that the knowledge captured has a questionable value to users or that teams 
do not know that there is useful knowledge in the database to help them (Keegan 
and Turner, 2002; Dixon, 2004; Newell et al., 2006). Database approaches fail as 
they rely overly on a perspective where knowledge is seen as an object that can be 
‘owned’: an ‘epistemology of possession’ (Blackler, 1995; Cook and Brown, 1999; 
Marshall and Sapsed, 2000). Codification of knowledge will always be incomplete 
(McDermott, 1999; Prencipe and Tell, 2001; Sapsed et al., 2002; Scarbrough et al., 
2004). 
 
 
Along this reasoning, the ‘objects’ literature (Carlile, 2002; Sapsed and Salter, 2004; 
Cacciatori, 2008) has characterised database systems as central ‘boundary objects’ 
(Star and Griesemer, 1989)  to analyse how learning can bring enduring benefits in 
PBOs. Boundary objects are purported to support collaborative work being 
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adaptable to the requirements of each context as they have no inherent meaning in 
themselves: They are “…empty vessels to be filled with whatever is the preferred 
local beverage.” (Sapsed and Salter, 2004, p. 1519). Project databases for learning 
purposes are an oft-used example.  
 
Cacciatori’s (2008) study shows simple artefacts can act as “boundary objects 
across occupations and as memory devices across projects” (Cacciatori 
2008:1591). Their temporal capacity is stressed as “points of juncture in a widely 
distributed memory system, enabling project-based firms to balance preservation 
and adaptation of knowledge”. As pointed out by Cacciatori (2008), we know little 
about the temporal dimension of boundary objects; particularly on their role of 
allowing knowledge preservation and adaptation within projects and PBOs. Sapsed 
and Salter (2004) showed the limitation of project tools as boundary objects in 
large-scale projects across dispersed organizations. While the absent factors in this 
failure case, namely regular face-to-face interaction among participants, and the 
lack of legitimate authority are shown to let the IT artifacts ‘lapse’ as boundary 
objects, one can imagine alternative circumstances where large scale IT artifacts 
are used intensively and are supported by the absent factors in this case as well as 
others. 
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Similarly, the cases from Newell et al.(2001; 2006) appear to be rooted in the 
processes and management surrounding the IT artifacts, for example, project 
workers feeling overly pressured on current tasks to spend time interrogating the 
database (that may yield insights to execute those current tasks), or difficulties in 
finding useful information, which may be a design or content issue. 
 
To some extent these concerns are less attributable to the IT artifact, such as 
databases, than other factors related to management and environment, and there 
is a long standing tendency for IT artifacts to “disappear” from information 
systems research as researchers focus on surrounding processes and effects 
(Orlikowski and Iacono, 2001). Rather there is no evidence of intrinsic problems 
with databases, but a failure of procedures, support and motivations. Social 
tendencies may subvert technologies designed with the best intentions for 
collaboration, such as the distributed nature of technologies aimed at knowledge 
sharing, such as intranets on Newell et al.’s (2001) study, which reinforced 
divisions between local groups. 
 
Because of our interest in intra-firm variation of innovation, we wonder what are 
the conditions that engender successful cases, which show how IT objects can play 
a role in knowledge transfer in a large-scale organization, and whether this 
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represents only standardised replication or the possibility that IT objects may 
support variation. We include the following sub-question to our guiding research 
question: 
 
 What role do Information Technology artifacts play in the 
transfer of innovations? 
 
Our sense following from this review is that effective innovation transfer through 
IT objects is likely to need motivational and behavioural support. 
 
 
Behaviour and anthropophagy 
 
As important as are organisational processes to support knowledge transfer and 
the technical characteristics of IT artifacts, there is another missing ingredient that 
we feel may explain successful innovation adoption across an organisation. This is 
the behavioural dimension and the area of motivation. 
 
We know that there are motivational barriers to knowledge transfer (Bresnen et 
al., 2003; Hall and Sapsed, 2005). The human qualities and frailties of desire, egos, 
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and incentives play a key role in knowledge sharing (Hansen et al., 1999; Brown 
and Starkey, 2000). Szulanski (2003) has argued that ‘stickiness’ of knowledge is 
partly determined by unwillingness on the part of the transferor, because of a 
perceived loss of control over innovations and the recognition for them. Equally on 
the transferee side there is the ‘Not Invented Here’ instinctive reluctance to accept 
innovations from other departments, even in the same company. Katz and Allen 
(1982) showed that the NIH syndrome works to the detriment of performance as a 
project team’s communication with external sources of ideas declines, usually as a 
result of stable project team membership over time. This can be the case in PBOs 
where core teams tend to stick together over a series of projects and become less 
interested in other inputs. Szulanski argues that a close relationship between the 
source and the receiver reduces these barriers to knowledge transfer. Yet even with 
the regular contact recommended by Sapsed and Salter (2004) we still feel there is 
an attitudinal variable that affects the transfer and adoption of innovations. 
 
Considering the tropical nature of our case organisation we began to apply a theory 
long established in Brazil but deriving from the humanities disciplines: 
anthropophagia, usually translated into English as anthropophagy, literally, the 
eating of human flesh. This theory introduced by the writer Oswald de Andrade in 
1928 became influential in the 1930s in representing Brazil’s relationship to other 
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cultures, referred to by the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, and the 
philosopher Albert Camus, who had met Andrade: 
 
The French writer did not comment further upon Andrade’s theory, but 
understood it properly, for his terse definition—anthropophagy as a vision 
of the world —implies the perception of anthropophagy as a metaphorical 
definition of the appropriation of otherness. (Rocha, 2013) 
 
Andrade’s theory, drawing on historical examples (including the reported case of 
the first bishop to arrive in Brazil, who was eaten, implausibly named Bishop 
Sardine) was in truth a provocative play on colonialist perceptions of Brazil but 
had some resonance. Beyond the visceral metaphor, this idea of “the appropriation 
of otherness” has been applied to literature in the 1930s, the Tropicalia movement 
of the 1960s, as well as other forms of cultural importation, which signifies a 
genuine openness to foreign/ alien/ other ideas but importantly represents a 
defence against colonialism, in that the ingestion and digestion of foreign ideas is 
in reality a combination or synthesis. 
 
Anthropophagy has more recently been introduced to the organisation studies 
literature (Islam, 2011; Wood and Caldas, 2002; Spicer, 2004) serving as a 
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metaphor to denote the appropriation and creative reinterpretation of 
organisational practices, reasoning and structures, especially for developing 
countries. Mimicry and other forms of imitation is a recurrent behaviour in the 
innovation literature on catching-up and emerging economies, especially so in the 
East Asian countries (Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Hobday, 1995; Lee and Kim, 2001). 
Anthropophagy as a form of mimicry implies identification with the indigenous 
primitive as well as admiration of the incoming other (Islam, 2011). It appears a 
more proactive form of imitative development, different to the classical Asian 
‘reverse engineering’ to (re)produce products identical to imports, in that the 
processes and outcomes deviate from their original templates. There is an 
unwillingness to take on management practices and ideas in their pure form, in 
favour of some local creativity (Wood and Caldas, 1998; Islam, 2011). It is this 
spirit that we find in our empirical case that we will set out.  
 Data and Methods 
The research was designed as an exploratory case study within Petrobras - 
Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. This subject was selected since the research questions 
require a large  PBO within which innovations would be expected to occur, and 
ideally one with strategies and management for inter-project capture and transfer, 
including IT artifacts. Petrobras fulfils all these requirements; it operates in a 
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number of advanced technology fields, and as an internationally competitive 
company, it has activities, facilities and influence all over the continent-sized nation 
of Brazil that are organised through projects. We were able to secure privileged 
access to significant data to allow the depth needed for a single case study (Yin, 
2014; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
The unit of Petrobras analysed for this study was ‘The Engineering’, itself a PBO 
with 8,000 people working in 227 on-going projects in several states across Brazil 
in 2011 and an amount of investment around $ 47 billion1. It was the first unit of 
the company to formally design processes of learning and transferring practices 
across projects, especially regarding innovations. 
 
We collected data as follows: documentation for qualitative analysis; participant 
observation with field notes on 15 projects’ innovation activities between January, 
2010 and April 2011; and a database with 1,104 innovation records. The primary 
source documents of internal processes related to the management processes for 
innovation, its adoption and diffusion, as understood by Petrobras and the 
Engineering unit. Data collected included prescriptive documents on the activities, 
roles and responsibilities for the processes, as well as checklists from the 
                                                 
1 R$ 104,41 billion (Brazilian reais). Source: www.petrobras.com.br  (2013 data - last update: May 2014) 
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management units. The observation took place during the steps of identifying and 
registering the innovations within the projects; during the meetings with the 
experts for the approval of the innovations for the internal diffusion process; and 
during the events realised for the dissemination of the approved innovations.  
 
The Engineering created and maintained a database that provided detailed 
information on the innovations’ records and approval. The innovations registered 
in the database were classified into two groups: discretionary and mandatory. The 
discretionary innovation may be adopted by other projects, but its use does not 
become compulsory. Although it was successfully adopted by the project that 
registered it on the database, new adoptions will occur only at the discretion of 
each potential adopter who may review the information. The mandatory 
innovation, on the other hand, must be adopted by other projects defined by 
experts during its approval, directed towards a more permanent knowledge base 
for the organization. For the purposes of this study, the 1,104 innovations analysed 
are the ones that have finished their process of analysis by the company and are 
ready for the internal diffusion. At this stage they are available to database users. 
Innovations that were still being analysed by the experts during data collection 
were not used as data for this study. 
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The study involved three stages:  
 
First, we analysed the internal documents, which describe and set the standards 
for the process. All these documents could be accessed on the Engineering 
department intranet together with general information about the projects. The 
purpose of this analysis was to understand how the formal process was intended to 
flow, from these largely prescriptive documents.  
 
Secondly, we selected the projects to be observed among the 227 projects running 
concurrently with the research. The criterion for the selection was to observe any 
project developing the innovation process from the beginning to the end, during 
the year of 2010. There were 15 such projects observed that were undertaking this 
process, with different sizes and structures, including refineries, platforms and 
pipelines. By the end of 2010, three of these projects had a delay in their schedule 
and only finished the process by 2011. The last had finished by April 2011, when 
the data collection was concluded. The intention was to observe how the actual 
processes that were designed to capture and transfer innovation were enacted, 
since formal and actual processes may deviate (Hobday and Brady, 2002). We made 
notes on the interactions within meetings regarding decision-making on approving 
innovations. We observed how, for example, experts would telephone engineers 
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who had worked on the projects being considered, to check on missing 
information, often related to specific technical dimensions to enable easier re-
enactment, or health and safety issues. We noted any disagreement and resistance 
to the flow of decisions, the influence of particular actors, and divergence from 
formal procedures. 
 
The third stage consisted of extracting and analysing the 1,104 innovation records 
from the database containing the knowledge and experiences from the projects. 
Information was gathered on main characteristics, structure, management and 
project innovation process. This data represented the outcomes of the innovation 
approval decision-making process, and the inputs to the innovation adoption 
process. Guided by overarching research questions on processes of transfer, and 
the use of the database by the wider organisation, with this large dataset we were 
able to see general patterns such as numbers of innovations approved and rejected, 
numbers made mandatory, and information on other projects’ and divisions’ 
adoptions of innovations through comments and notes, on for example, divisions 
where adopted etc. 
 
Table 1 in the Appendix describes the main characteristics of the projects observed 
in this study. It includes the information about the innovation registered in the 
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database by the project teams (main areas and type of innovations) as well as the 
meetings and activities that we observed during the data collection.  
 
The case study organisation: Petrobras 
Petrobras - Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. is a leading company in the oil and energy 
industry ranking among the ten biggest energy companies in the world2. It ranked 
the 5th position in 2011 and the 3rd position in 20103 (the period of data 
collection). Petrobras is a publicly traded corporation, whose majority stockholder 
is the Government of Brazil. As an oil and energy company, it operates in the 
following sectors: exploration and production, refining, oil and natural gas trade 
and transportation, petrochemicals and derivatives, electric energy, biofuel and 
other renewable energy source distribution. Table 2 below sums up information 
about Petrobras’ profile and refers to 2013 fiscal year result data, with the last 
update on May 2014. 
 
Table 2: Petrobras’ profile 
                                                 
2  Source: IHS Energy – 2014 IHS Energy 50 (2013 rank). The IHS Energy 50, formerly the PFC Energy 
50, has for 15 years served as the ranking of the world's leading publicly traded energy companies by 
market capitalization. http://www.ihs.com/info/en/a/energy50/50.aspx  
3 Source: PFC Energy – 2012 IHS Energy 50 (2011 rank). 
https://www.pfcenergy.com/~/media/Files/Public%20Files/PFC%20Energy%2050/Final_PFC_Energy
_50_2012.pdf 
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Activities Scale 
Investments R$ 104.41 billion 
Net Revenue R$ 304.89 billion 
Net Profit R$ 23.57 billion 
Shareholders 798,596 
Global Presence 17 countries* 
Number of Employees 86,111 
Daily Output 2,539,000 barrels of oil equivalent a 
day. 
*Not including representative offices  
 
Petrobras is the Brazilian company with the largest investments in science and 
technology especially in CENPES (Research Center Leopoldo Americo Miguez de 
Mello), a leading applied research centre. CENPES works with various national and 
foreign Research and Development (R&D) institutions, including integrated 
technological partnerships with universities and research centres. These 
connections have reinforced the organization’s innovation activities to the point 
that by the early to mid 1990s Petrobras was playing a leading role in the 
international industry in creating and applying totally novel technologies. For 
example, it repeatedly broke world records in production and drilling water depths 
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(Dantas and Bell, 2009). 
 
The innovation processes 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
Petrobras set up an Innovation Process Department to establish a system of 
identifying, recording and transferring innovations. The essential sequence is 
shown in Figure 1 with key actors at each stage. Recording of the innovations 
began not in a post-project review, but were recommended at regular points 
throughout the project. The project life cycle consists of five phases (Phase I: 
opportunity identification; Phase II: conceptual project; Phase III: basic project; 
Phase IV: implementation and works; Phase V: Shutdown, and a review would take 
place in the transition point between each stage. This is because memories are 
short, and also because people often move between projects and so their 
contributions may be lost if reviews only occur at the end. Project Managers 
selected a team to identify the experiences from the project that had promise as 
innovation for adoption elsewhere, and these were gathered in form documents. In 
practice, it was difficult to hold multiple reviews on all projects, especially 
involving people working “in the field, not at a comfortable desk at the office” as a 
team member reported in the Diesel Hydro Treating Unit/ IERV project during its 
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final dissemination event, who complained that project workers “do not have time 
to stop working to explain to someone else how to do my job”. (personal 
communication, 8.10.10). Nevertheless there were penalties for those that did not 
fulfil the review procedure. 
 
Once innovations were identified distinctive technical groups would reflect on 
their project experiences in turn, such as mechanics, civil engineering, cathodic 
protection, environment etc. The technical orientation of these discussions may be 
an advantage over other approaches to reviews, which are often project 
management- oriented. In the Engineering project managers did not attend these 
reviews. Discussions were always driven by the degree of novelty offered by the 
technique, installation or practice, and its potential for benefit in other 
circumstances. This was not an exercise in assigning blame or unpicking 
management problems, which is sometimes how project reviews are viewed. 
Following substantial discussions - often up to two months- a large evaluation 
event was held to assess collectively the innovations to be recorded in the 
database. These events involved presentations and subsequent discussions seen as 
opportunities to learn and reflect for a broad group representing the projects’ 
disciplines (including project managers at this stage). Finally the innovation 
records were approved or not approved for the database. 
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The next phase involved subject matter experts, who were designated by their 
disciplinary departments, which all had regular meetings related to innovation and 
development. This was the first ‘bottleneck’ faced by the Innovation Process 
Department (IPD), since initially many experts took too long or simply did not 
complete their assessments, considering these activities ‘an extra job’ (personal 
communication from Department Manager). This is an experience familiar from 
the prior literature, yet in this case the IPD persisted with various tactics to 
encourage engagement including individual training initiatives and additional 
support; regularly scheduled meetings with the IPD with the specific purpose of 
assessing the records; mobilizing higher level managers for sponsorship; and, at a 
later stage, an organisational plan to acknowledge the experts’ contribution, which 
was considered a key motivator that raised the experts’ visibility.  
 
The outcome of these expert review meetings was either approval of the 
innovation for wider adoption, a request for its review, or rejection. In making 
these judgements experts would regularly call a proposal’s author to clarify some 
information, or another personal contact to compare with a similar experience. 
The experts’ reviews were replete with multitudes of details, concerned with 
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measurements, understanding scale, the nature of resources and tools used and 
the surrounding conditions of the innovations, all to assess how applicable they 
would be in other contexts. Proposals were rejected if lacking technical accuracy 
and/or reliability but in most cases because they were excessively costly or 
because they were considered not sufficiently innovative, since authors of 
proposals may not be as aware of the wider technical frontier as the experts. 
Rejections were communicated as learning opportunities to the authors.  
 
Expert groups included those responsible for processes that may need updating if 
innovations were approved for mandatory adoption, such as standards, manuals, 
documents and procedures. Experts themselves often took on responsibility for 
making changes, indicative of their influence. Mandatory innovations generally 
took time to approve because of the need to create instructive documents and 
modify existing procedures. The average time for a mandatory innovation was over 
a year - 379 days  - while the average approval time for a discretionary innovation 
was less than two months - 54 days. Senior Management took the process seriously 
and attended some meetings; especially where innovations were to be discussed 
that may also be adopted in projects outside the Engineering. In these latter cases 
interested stakeholders from beyond the Engineering boundaries were also invited 
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to participate. 
 
Diffusion, adoption and adaptation 
 
Each project manager was responsible for the new adoption of a mandatory 
innovation, for the changes needed in the project and for the learning processes 
which were necessary for that innovation to be adopted. The Engineering 
management units considered the database to be the main communication channel 
for the diffusion process, as spontaneously stated during the observation of 
meetings with project managers. Its use was encouraged and disseminated 
through training, through events or activities to record the project innovations or 
to communicate those that were already approved. Once approved, innovations 
were publicised in the intranet or presented in an event exclusively for this 
purpose, called ‘Dissemination Event’, as happened with the Coker Unit REDUC4 / 
IERC and the Jacket Offshore Platform PMXL1 / IEMX projects, which sought the 
support of the IPD. The project managers of both units were aware of the 
                                                 
4 A coker unit is an oil refinery processing unit that converts the residual oil from the vacuum distillation 
column or the atmospheric distillation column into low molecular weight hydrocarbon gases, naphtha, 
light and heavy gas oils, and petroleum coke. IUPAC. Compendium of Chemical Terminology, 2nd 
ed. (the "Gold Book"). Compiled by A. D. McNaught and A. Wilkinson. Blackwell Scientific 
Publications, Oxford (1997) 
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importance of the process as they had already seen useful innovations in the 
database. They proactively asked to develop the dissemination events of their 
projects as they knew there were other projects that might benefit from their 
experiences.  There was also guidance for the projects to identify innovations in the 
database and to use them as an input during the risk management phase before the 
project starts. However it is significant that many of the project managers 
requested dissemination events themselves, which demonstrates an open attitude 
and hunger for knowledge about the innovations. While experts were rewarded for 
their participation in the approval stage, there were no such rewards or 
recognition for adopters or penalties for failure to adopt.  
 
Dissemination events were held either after a project had finished registering their 
innovations, or to prepare for a project in its initial stages. In the first case, the 
project manager identified similar projects within the same enterprise (division 
overseeing similar projects, refineries, for example) and the IPD identified other 
units and projects facing similar constructions or processes. For example, after the 
project of the semi-submersible platform P-51 had registered its innovations, a 
dissemination event presented them to the project teams of the semi-submersible 
platform P-56, a very similar structure, organized by the manager of the P-51 
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project. Similarly, the project of Naphtha Coker Unit of Duque de Caxias Refinery 
(REDUC) organised a dissemination event after registering their innovations, with 
the IPD, the organisers identified the refineries that were about to start similar 
projects for naphtha coke [derived from petroleum coker] and invited their project 
teams to attend the event. The manager of P-56 explained the benefits of the process 
and his motivation: “We don’t want to waste time. We can’t waste time because we have 
done it a lot. We are always reinventing the wheel, you know, and then we find out 
someone did the same in another project. And sometimes, to make it worse, sometimes 
it happened in another project of Marlim Sul, in our own yard. And then when we see it, 
we think ‘ouch! We could have used it here!’ Ok, maybe we would need to change 
something but we certainly didn’t have to do all that job”. (Dissemination Event, 
09.03.10) 
 
At the dissemination events, engineers who had worked on the innovations gave 
presentations on all those that were approved in the database, supported by the 
experts, followed by questions and discussion. For example, a refinery about to 
start the construction of a unit would hold an event before the earthworks. An 
outstanding case happened within a project from the Petrochemical Complex of 
Rio de Janeiro (COMPERJ). This project developed a pioneer work in Petrobras, as 
it had to construct and assemble seven parallel pipelines simultaneously within the 
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same track. A dissemination event was organised to analyse and discuss successful 
and applicable innovations. The event included experts from COMPERJ, innovating 
engineers from previous projects, representatives from the group of onshore 
pipelines, as well as delegates from equipment and materials suppliers. A central 
challenge was the building of COMPERJ’s pathway for the pipe ducts as stated in 
meetings between project managers and the executor group event. The event 
served to agree innovations that could be adopted to minimize cost and time in this 
complex project. For the first time, a project at the beginning of Phase I 
(opportunity identification) asked for a dissemination event. A project leader said 
“We came to IPD because we have a unique project. We haven’t done it in this way. At 
least not here in Petrobras. We have laid many kilometres of pipelines but now we have 
to lay down seven parallel pipelines in the same track all at the same time. It is 
something crazy! So we want to talk to everyone who is available – project teams, 
experts, suppliers, everyone – and we want to discuss with them. We need IPD help for 
that. We want to hear these people’s ideas and we want to see what innovations they 
have. Because then, then we have to decide internally which we can use or not. All the 
proposals discussed at the event shall undergo critical analysis in the study of 
constructability, which will confirm the viability or not of these techniques and if we 
will have to adapt any of them and which adaptations we can do.” (personal 
communication, 21.10.10). 
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The foregoing passages have shown a systematic, attentive and judicious program 
of approving and managing the diffusion of mandatory innovations with examples 
of successful adoptions. What then of the discretionary innovations, those that 
were examined and approved for inclusion on the database but not deemed to be 
required on all relevant projects? In the next section we present a brief nested case 
study that illustrates the internal ‘wave’ effect of diffusion of innovation within 
Petrobras, as well as the adaptation that occurs. 
 
Adoption and adaptation example: the GASTAU project and its successors 
 
The GASTAU project built a massive gas pipeline, the Caraguatatuba-Taubaté, 
which connects the gas treatment unit Caraguatatuba to its counterpart Monteiro 
Lobato in the city of Taubaté. This pipeline (28 inches in diameter and 96 
kilometers long) was designed to transport natural gas from Mexilhão field in 
Santos Bay at a rate of 20 million cubic meters of gas per day. The scale of the 
project was considerable, GASTAU crosses six different cities in the state of São 
Paulo (SP): Caraguatatuba, Paraibuna, Jambeiro, São José dos Campos, Caçapava 
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and Taubaté, where it interconnects with other pipelines. GASTAU itself used over 
8,000 pipes and generated an approximate 3,000 direct jobs (information on the 
GASTAU project derives from personal communications with its project managers, 
the enterprise manager immediately above them in the organisational hierarchy, 
and the project management support team, as well as corporate documentation 
from the Intranet made available to the researcher). 
 
GASTAU produced a number of innovative solutions that were necessary due to its 
complexity and the need to "avoid impacts on the progress of the work while 
minimizing environmental damage", as reported by the project manager 
(Dissemination Event, 16/06/10). The main challenges of the project stemmed 
from its non-standard nature: although Petrobras installs a great many pipelines 
the standard procedures were not feasible for GASTAU because of the adverse 
conditions faced in its construction, specifically topography, climate conditions and 
environmental constraints.  
 
For example, the project was developed in rough terrain with slopes up to 40 
degrees of tilt, where even specialist engines on tracks, known as side booms, 
designed especially for this type of pipe-laying challenge needed the support of 
other machines to perform the work. These side booms weighing on average 60 
 33 
tons were anchored with steel cables to a tractor installed on top of the hills. The 
pipeline also had to make five crossings of large rivers and three crossings of 
highways with over a million cubic meters of material removed in earthmoving 
activity. Other complex subtasks included building a tunnel more than five 
kilometres long in the State Park of Serra do Mar (so requiring environmental 
sensitivity), and a vertical duct shaft of more than 540 meters depth to connect the 
tunnel to the surface. GASTAU was the first project to implement a vertical duct to 
house a pipeline in Brazil. 
 
One GASTAU innovation called ‘inflatable coverage’ was a special canvas cover with 
a weather station and generators that provided power to fans to maintain 
ventilation and to keep the coverage inflated continuously. This process innovation 
mitigated adverse weather conditions, avoiding typical interruptions to work 
during rainfall and so reducing costs, as well as containing environmental impacts. 
Figure 2 shows images of one application of the inflatable coverage. 
 
Figure 2: Images of the GASTAU inflatable coverage 
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By April 2011, the ‘Inflatable coverage’ system had already been adopted or was in 
the process of adoption in three other projects within the Engineering 
organisation. The innovation’s ‘wake’ had reached to the South East (Guararema 
Compression Station, São Paulo state); North East (Abreu Lima Refinery, Ipojuca, 
Pernambuco state); and the South (Alberto Pasqualini Refinery, Canoas, Rio Grande 
do Sul), illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: The inflatable coverage innovation and its diffused wake 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
After the innovation was registered in the database, the information followed the 
Guararema Compression Station (SP) 
conclusion: May 2011 
Abreu Lima Refinery, Ipojuca (PE)  
conclusion: June 2011 
Alberto Pasqualini Refinery, Canoas (RS)  
conclusion: September 2011 Inflatable coverage: GASTAU project 
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regular flow. Experts on the subject ‘Terrestrial Pipelines’ assessed the information 
and it was approved as a discretionary innovation in 28 days. According to the 
experts, the innovation was ‘approved for use in other projects… New conditions 
have to be carefully studied and evaluated including technical, economical and 
safety aspects.’ 
 
Guararema Compression Station Project 
It is revealing to note which actors are involved in adoptions, and which are absent. 
In Guararema Compression Station Project, the adoption of the inflatable coverage 
combined expert engineers from GASTAU Project with experts from another 
Engineering unit called ‘Technology Development in Construction and Assembly’ 
which operates in the process of "preservation of knowledge in Supply of 
Enterprises"5. These experts and the Guararema project managers and contractors 
analysed the advantages and disadvantages of the inflatable coverage adoption and 
the need for adaptations in its adoption as the local difficulties were not only rain 
and continuity of work but difficulties of accessing the site because of the terrain. 
Flash floods regularly generate landslides sweeping away even permanent 
structures. The adaptations incurred a cost themselves but the project manager 
                                                 
5 One of its main attributions is to work on "technological development in the construction and assembly 
activities in the Supply unit, in conjunction with the executive managements of CENPES [R&D 
department], Materials, Information and Communication Technology (ICT), Supply Business Area 
and external entities." 
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said, “Even requiring technological improvements, the overall result has been 
positive. With the use of this technology, the impact of the rain and its 
consequences was mitigated.” (Dissemination Event, 16/06/10). 
 
The inflatable coverage for this unit measured 16 thousand square metres in 
surface area and about 36 meters in height. The experts assessed the adaptations 
done during the adoption: “The equipment for handling loads in the areas covered 
by this technology requires higher load capacity due to the angle limitation for the 
spears. An improvement over the previous applications is the shape of the 
coverage that extends the useful area, taking advantage of the coverage borders.” 
They recommended that the innovation must be adapted to the new project’s 
characteristics: “It is necessary to develop and consequently improve this 
technology and also an adaptation to its use; i.e. a re-education, an awareness that 
any project/work run under this coverage should have its activities, procedures, 
processes and logistics adapted [to the innovation adopted].”6 
 
Alberto Pasqualini Refinery 
In Alberto Pasqualini Refinery, the on-site Project of Diesel Hydrotreating Unit 
                                                 
6 These are excerpts from a technical assessment issued by ‘Technology Development in Construction 
and Assembly’ unit during the implementation of the inflatable coverage at Guararema Compression 
Station Project. 
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(UHDT II) also adopted the inflatable coverage in 2011, which would be the biggest 
coverage so far used by Petrobras in a refinery operational area. It measured 20 
thousand square metres in its surface area and about 40 meters in height. The 
adaptations in this version of the innovation included the construction of a 
synthetic membrane with Ultra Violet ray blocker and ventilation with low power 
consumption. This saved an estimated three months of downtime due to the effects 
of rain during a 14-month project. The experts from GASTAU Project and the 
‘Technology Development in Construction and Assembly’ Unit together with the 
engineers specific to the project again supported it. 
 
Abreu Lima Refinery 
In Abreu Lima Refinery, the Project of Delayed Coker Units (U-21 and U-22) made 
two installations of inflatable coverage, which needed adaptation to accommodate 
the use of drilling machines. The coverage ‘footprint’ measured 30 square meters 
in diameter and 100 meters long, with the highest point at the centre at 13 meters 
high, so allowing for the drilling machines. The inflatable coverage leaned on the 
ground, being completely sealed and inflated by fans. They were assembled in the 
works of the buildings of coke reactors of U-21 and U-22. In this area, there were 
activities of staking, preparation of blocks and superstructure. With the coverage, 
these activities would be maintained on schedule, even with the heavy rains that 
 39 
are typical of the Northeastern climes of Pernambuco.  
 
In order to check the needs to adapt the inflatable coverage, managers of the 
Project of Delayed Coker Units U-21 and U-22 requested a Preliminary Risk 
Analysis (APR), which was executed by experts from all involved areas inside the 
refinery, as well as a constructability study following the signing of the contract. 
This study confirmed that the use of inflatable coverage produced benefits to the 
progress of the work. The Abreu Lima project involved no personnel from the 
initial GASTAU project, showing that this was an adoption of an innovation first 
developed over 2000 kilometres away, implemented and indeed adapted to local 
needs by an entirely different workforce. This indicates the power of the processes 
and the data made available as well as the willingness of the project managers and 
engineers to use this innovation for their own purposes.  
 
These three differing manifestations of the Inflatable Coverage system show 
varying degrees of involvement from the initial innovators, but all show 
enthusiastic adoption and modifications from the local units of the Engineering 
organisation and its contractors. The technical knowledge was partly diffused 
through experts, through professional contacts and networking, through deliberate 
diffusion processes, but also through the documentation on the database. This non-
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mandatory innovation was diffused and accepted voluntarily and spontaneously 
and resulted in three distinctive versions at three locations at considerable 
distance to its point of origin. 
 
In the Appendix we include a table of 46 innovation records from the database, 
which are all innovations that were adopted successfully throughout the 
organization, many from geographically and organisationally separate units. 19 of 
these are mandatory, yet remarkably, 27 are discretionary innovations, 
summarised in Table 3. These were like the wake of the GASTAU inflatable 
coverage, not rolled out by corporate decree to achieve economies of repetition, 
but identified in project workers’ own search activities and voluntarily taken up. 
  Table 3: Adopted innovations summary by type 
   
19 MI 
5 Adopted by 1 other project from different unit 
4 Adopted by 2 other projects from different units 
2 Adopted by 1 other project within the same unit 
6 Adopted by 2 other projects within the same unit 
1 Adopted by 3 other projects within the same unit 
1 Adopted by other units (no data on where or number) 
   
27 DI 
1 Adopted by 1 other project from different unit 
10 Adopted by 1 other project within the same unit 
6 Adopted by 2 other projects within the same unit 
3 Adopted by 3 other projects within the same unit 
7 Adopted by external contractors 
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Discussion 
 
We began this paper with two discrepancies that we find in the literature on the 
temporary organisation. While the PBO is argued to hold benefits for innovation it 
has disadvantages in making those innovations count in the permanent 
organization (Hobday, 2000; Scarbrough et al., 2004; Bresnen et al., 2003). The 
most reliable route for successful transfer of innovation is through economies of 
repetition, where advances from innovative projects are repeated across the 
organisation and embedded in firm capabilities (Davies and Brady, 2000; Brady 
and Davies, 2004; Davies and Brady, 2015). Yet this transition appears counter to 
novelty and so we enquired whether intra-firm innovation diffusion could occur, in 
the same manner as the waves and wakes observed by Boland et al. (2007). Are 
multiple manifestations of innovations possible in the same firm?  
 
The second complication of the literature is the puzzle of IT artefacts and their 
apparent failure to help the process of transfer. We asked whether the well-known 
failure cases were attributable to IT objects per se or whether there may be 
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alternative outcomes under other conditions. It seemed to us the two 
complications of adaptive diffusion and IT objects are related, or at least their 
solutions may be related. 
 
The Petrobras case shows a PBO that can indeed transfer innovations successfully 
from one project to multiple others. It shows the processes how this is done, which 
include a central role for a database, and while these produce mandatory practices  
the outcomes are not only simple replications but adaptations that constitute 
innovations in themselves. How was this achieved? 
 
The success of the Petrobras experiences depended on a number of factors. Firstly, 
the importance of subject matter experts in the process, consistent with 
Blindenbach-Driessen and Van den Ende (2006), who also noted that the availability of 
experts increased the effectiveness of project teams. Petrobras experts were heavily 
involved in scrutinising the novelty and wider applicability of the innovation before 
they were approved for the database. This gave a gravitas to the process, and 
particularly to the quality of the content of the records, because users knew that 
they had undergone technical examination from advanced specialists. While much 
of the organizational knowledge literature downplays hierarchy and status 
(Takeuchi and Nonaka, 2000; Tsoukas, 1996) in this case there is a kind of humility 
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and receptiveness that recognises the value of accumulated knowledge, which 
relates to the behavioural factors we discuss below.  There are however costs to this 
involvement of experts, including as Lindkvist (2005) argued that the mix of experts 
with highly specialized and diverse competences makes it difficult “to establish shared 
understandings or a common knowledge base” (Lindkvist, 2005, p. 1190), which has 
the effect of slowing down the process as in Petrobras, as well as the logistics of 
scheduling intensive work with highly-paid senior engineers with many demands on 
their time.  
 
However, this technical orientation differs from post project reviews that are seen 
as perfunctory exercises focusing on management lessons likes sources of delay or 
overspend. Examples from the literature show project workers dismissing 
databases because of a lack of confidence that they hold quality, relevant data, such 
as Newell et al. (2006). This can be viewed as a matter of content production and 
editing and the Petrobras case shows a different outcome where content is 
carefully produced and authoritative. 
 
The hazards and failures of database approaches to transfer in the literature are 
attributed to the epistemology of possession where knowledge is perceived as an 
object (Cook and Brown, 1999; Blackler, 1995; Marshall and Sapsed, 2000), 
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neglecting social contact and processes or lacking legitimising support from senior 
management (Bresnen et al., 2003; Sapsed and Salter, 2004), yet these failures are 
not intrinsic properties of databases themselves, but rather that databases are not 
sufficient and are likely to fail without the management and support structure 
around them. One can notionally design a system where (1) a database fulfils a 
necessary role of storing and effectively legitimising knowledge, which has been 
rigorously judged and designed to benefit broader applications, (2) management 
processes and structures are maintained which ensure social contact to publicise 
and reinforce the data as well as to facilitate its input and access, that (3) senior 
management visibly supports. The Petrobras case shows empirically how these 
conditions may be operationalized, even with the inevitable frictions, delays and 
costs. 
The case also showed that the processes were not all smooth and straightforward, 
there were bottlenecks and low prioritisation problems familiar from the 
literature, yet these were mitigated by the persistence of a dedicated team in the 
IPD, as well as active support from senior management. Nevertheless the 
protracted lead-time of approval, especially for mandatory innovations, may mean 
that the innovation is outmoded by the time it is published. From the total number 
of 1,104 innovations, 112 (10.1%) were made mandatory while 992 (89.9%) were 
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discretionary.  
The temporary and the permanent 
The bifurcation of innovations into mandatory and discretionary may be analysed 
according to their resulting permanence or temporariness. These are shown in 
Figure 4. Innovations become permanent practices through the process analysed 
above, whereby domain experts and senior managers adjudge and approve 
innovations and commit them to the database. This also entails adjustments to 
existing procedures to accommodate the newly approved process. To support this 
implementation managers disseminate the processes actively throughout the 
national organization. Once through this passage the innovations may be in use 
through subsequent projects indefinitely.  
Figure 4: Processes and permanence 
 Mandatory Innovations Discretionary Innovations 
Permanent Experts + senior 
managers change 
processes, documents, 
databases, and 
Wide spread diffusion due 
to effectiveness, cost 
advantages;  
Perhaps overlooked by 
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disseminate through 
organization. 
Innovations are made 
standard operating 
procedures 
formal channels but gain 
exposure through 
dissemination and 
publicity 
 
Temporary Experts + senior 
managers start the 
process of making 
mandatory, but 
innovation is superseded 
by alternatives, e.g. lower 
costs, political reasons/ 
personnel loss, etc.) 
Effective for local use but 
lacking diffusion 
dynamics, unsupported 
outside of context of 
application 
 
 
However the process of mandatory-process-making can be stymied. This occurs 
when an innovation has begun the mandatory journey but superior alternatives 
become available before it reaches final approval. If a lower-cost, or more effective 
practice surfaces that challenges the candidate innovation it is dropped, achieving 
mandatory and permanent status for only a short time, even if achieves final 
approval. There is also a political aspect to these outcomes where supporters of the 
rival innovation will advance its cause, often in cases where personnel have moved 
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or changed interests, and the original innovation lacks its initial support. These are 
complications that can occur with the type of ‘top-down’ ‘business-led’ learning 
outlined by Brady and Davis (2004), where the path from vanguard to repetition 
may be in jeopardy in the absence of committed senior management. 
 
The temporary nature of these aborted mandatory innovations resembles cases of 
discretionary innovations that are not adopted. Specificity is the double-edged 
sword of these innovations in that they were created, tested and executed to solve a 
particular problem, yet this exclusivity finds it no friends outside the local context 
of application. Without the publicity that follows effective deployment in multiple 
contexts the innovation fails the mandatory requirements and fails to attract 
interest for casual experimentation. The innovations are registered on the system 
but are not picked up and diffused. They are permanent only in their dormancy. 
 
But discretionary innovations may also become permanent. They lack the 
institutional support of the mandatory process as they are adjudged to fall short of 
the most usable innovations, yet develop a momentum of their own. This is simply 
because of the benefits and value the innovation brings, which is demonstrated 
beyond its original context. Engineers and managers from fresh projects will 
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become aware of the innovation through the Dissemination Events, through their 
community of practice or may have found its information through searching the 
database in related areas. They are applied to new locations and tasks, possibly 
modified, and adopted for their effectiveness and/ or cost advantages. The 
diffusion dynamics of these innovations are those that are most similar to market 
forces. Adoption is not driven by management fiat but pulled-through by the 
demands of project managers and engineers who find value in the innovations.  
 
What is clear is that innovations become permanent practices either because of 
managerial fiat, or through their effectiveness. In both cases the database and 
surrounding systems are important to their diffusion, but these objects only 
mediate the transition, the innovations only ‘live on’ through the projects that 
adopt them. Through their constant reuse and application and adjustment their 
organizational lives are prolonged. 
 
Motivation, adaptation and the anthropophagic organization 
 
Despite the processes and quality of data we recognise that these technical factors 
are not themselves sufficient. Yet what is clear is the importance of motivation 
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affecting the transfer of knowledge (Hansen et al., 1999; Szulankski, 2003; Hall and 
Sapsed, 2005) and solutions have remained elusive. We believe the case contains 
clues on this softer aspect. In contrast to barriers and difficulties found in the 
literature, such as the NIH syndrome where project teams become disinterested in 
developments and innovations developed externally, adopters were not only 
willing to take innovations on, but also to advance them in new applications. This 
we feel is important motivationally and has implications for making the temporary 
permanent.  
 
Importantly the modified innovations exemplified by the wake of the GASTAU 
project show that there is adaptation occurring in the process. This is not the 
classical imitation documented by the catching-up literature such as reverse 
engineering of imported products and the learning curve from Original Equipment 
Manufacture to Original Design Manufacture to Original Brand Manufacture in 
Asian emerging economies (Hobday, 1995; Lee and Lim, 2001). Instead in the 
statements of adopting participants and the behaviour observed we find evidence 
of openness to new ideas, but also a desire to consume these and contribute to new 
combined forms. This is particularly striking in the adoption of discretionary 
innovations with Petrobras, including the GASTAU examples, which were not 
enforced through templates, and standard procedures, but voluntarily taken up. We 
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believe this openness is linked not only to the credibility of the expert-informed 
process but it is also linked to the drive for adaptation. 
 
Combination is recognised as core to innovation in business, science, technology, as 
well as arts and culture (Schumpeter, 1942; Simonton, 2004; Arthur, 2009; Sapsed 
and Tschang, 2014). The instinct to fuse new ideas with old ideas, or ideas from 
different domains is a fundamental drive of advance. This describes the behaviour 
we have observed in Petrobras, the scrutiny and quality of information not only for 
mandatory practices, but also to seed discretionary adoptions, the willingness of 
geographically and organisationally distant units to consume this information, and 
the outcomes in terms of adapted forms and on-going trajectories. The 
anthropophagic attitude is the elusive, motivational ‘x-ingredient’ that determines 
the success of the temporary to permanent transition, alongside the managerial 
and technical objects, receiving, holding and disseminating data.  
 
The overall model is represented in Figure 5. The anthropophagic attitude 
pervades the processes and the IT objects, influencing the receptivity to the 
meetings and Dissemination events, the access to the databases and their 
absorption and application in new adapted forms. The three core elements all are 
important: the objects must contain data that is highly credible, which is ensured 
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by the work of the subject matter experts; this work of evaluations and approval 
requires rigorous processes, but well-designed and implemented processes are 
also required for the offline dissemination in a face-to-face capacity. Fundamentally 
the willingness of the participants to engage is crucial and this is driven by the 
desire to learn and recreate in new contexts. We find one or more of these factors 
and nuances to be absent in the failure cases in the literature. 
 
Figure 5: The Anthropophagic Organization 
 
 
 
  
 
Conclusions 
 
Our interest was driven by puzzles suggested by the literature as well as apparent 
success of our empirical case. We found in the Petrobras organization not only 
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successful adoptions of innovation, which appeared to challenge the well-
documented difficulties of transferring innovations in the same PBO, but we also 
observed that this involved a central database in spite of scepticism, and that the 
innovations were not rolled out as replications, but taken on and modified to match 
new environments, creating new differentiated forms. It is through this 
adaptability that the temporary to permanent transition occurs, as project workers 
find value in the innovations to their on-going work.  
 
As much as the literature rails against epistemology of possession approaches and 
the need to combine this with epistemology of practice, yet such a combination is 
left implicit and it is instructive to show where such a combination has been made 
to work. The Petrobras case shows diligent, persistent processes involving the 
most erudite engineers, legitimised by senior management. The quality of 
information is high because of this expert scrutiny and attention to feasibility of 
applicability in new contexts. The dissemination stage was extensive, so that the 
innovation records in the database were explained and promoted by experts and 
those people that had applied them successfully. These stories and potential 
resources were disseminated through communities of practice in the organization, 
rather than simply stored in a repository. The three-stage process combined 
technical gravitas, face-to-face interaction, legitimizing authority as well as the 
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uses of codified data.  
 
Evidence suggests that codified data is increasingly important in 
contemporary organizational practice and performance, referred to with terms 
such as ‘Big Data’ or ‘Data Science’ (McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2012; Chen et al., 
2012). It may be that the more critical studies in the literature were investigating 
an earlier generation of database approaches, and now both the technology and 
processes have advanced and improved. The emphasis now seems to have shifted 
from ‘database’ to ‘data’, which suggests a new model that is less centralized and 
static, more pulled by users and responsive to innovation but nevertheless 
requiring new skills that are scarce. In any case there is a risk of being dismissive 
of the power of IT artifacts, especially when used in conjunction with effective 
social and managerial processes as demonstrated in the case study.  
 
The literature emphasises the competing pressures that undermine transfer 
initiatives, the demotivating NIH syndrome and the scuppered receptivity through 
the need to update capabilities. Given all these retarding factors it was remarkable 
to find the number of successful adoptions throughout the organisation, shown in 
Tables 1 and 3. Closer examination showed that these not replications or repeated 
solutions however, but adaptations. 
 54 
 
Adaptation was necessary in the Petrobras projects because of the widely differing 
climate and topographical conditions of the continental-sized field of operations. 
Repeatable solutions would not be sufficient in many cases and allowance was 
needed for local modification. In a sense this turns the fundamental problem of 
unique projects on its head, because of uniqueness this stimulates processes that 
allow sufficient flexibility to actually apply prior experiences. In this sense prior 
innovations are not so much templates, but become boundary objects, useful 
focusing devices that are open to individualised tailoring and manipulation to fit. It 
is not the objects themselves that provide permanence however, essentially 
permanence is only realised through activation in the temporary: in on-going 
projects. Permanence only in the object is death. To paraphrase Shakespeare, the 
database records can only be eternal lines to be bound to time if breathing project 
managers and engineers can see them, and give life to them. Paradoxically the 
visceral metaphor of anthropophagy works here, since it evokes the belief that 
spirits live on through their consumption through integration with those dining.  
 
Yet as much as cannibalism is appropriation of the other its distinctive and 
shocking nature is that it is appropriation of the other within the same species. The 
cases of successful transfer and knowledge leakage to which Boland et al. (2007) 
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refer in their wakes of diffusion are all inter-firm networks, while the adaptations 
we found exemplified by the GASTAU project and its wake were all intra-firm. Such 
dynamics are possible we argue through the link to motivation. There is great 
intrinsic reward in creating something new and which solves local problems, 
rather than repeating a template from elsewhere. Given the processes, data objects 
and motivational conditions outlined we show how internal wakes or waves can be 
stimulated. 
 
Limitations and research opportunities 
 
An important caveat to all the foregoing analysis of the Petrobras case is that we 
have not stressed the considerable financial costs of this process. As impressive as 
the innovation transfer infrastructure is with its dedicated personnel, protracted 
employment of expensive subject matter experts, proliferation of dissemination 
events, training and support we should conclude it must be costly indeed. The 
outcomes are equally impressive and dispersed throughout the organisation. 
Senior management made the original investment with the creation of the IPD, this 
was sanctioned by the Engineering and effectively by the project managers 
themselves who contributed to processes like the Dissemination Events from their 
own budgets. The view was widely held that it was a worthy investment. We 
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should remember however that Petrobras is a highly resourced firm in the 
lucrative energy sector and not all organisations will stretch to these levels. We 
would suggest that similar effects could be achieved on a more modest scale, as 
long as the three elements are present. This is a heuristic for further research on 
PBOs with varying levels of cash flow and organizational slack. 
 
As a single case study there are the usual limitations regarding generalizability. The 
case study has covered multiple projects within this one PBO however, and we have 
analysed a dataset of 1104 innovations across a range of engineering fields. Yet in 
addition to the financial resources there are other specificities. One is the cultural 
phenomenon of anthropophagy, which thus far has been applied almost exclusively 
to Brazil. We have distinguished it from other innovation transfer behaviours such 
as reverse engineering and it does seem a naturally Brazilian attitude, which can be 
seen in its mashed-up arts and cultural forms, in music like jazz and samba in 
Bossa Nova, or dance and martial arts in capoeira, or the many variants of football 
played in beaches, impromptu fields and volleyball courts, adapted to the terrain. 
Brazilian life is replete with examples of imported ideas given a local twist. While 
anthropophagy in organisational research on Brazil has been growing in interest 
we have not seen studies in the wider Latin American continent refer to this 
cultural tendency in relation to innovation. Superficially Petrobras represents an 
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‘outlier’ case as a high-spender on R&D and large-scale employer of highly-
educated researchers and engineers, while the literature continues to report that 
the Latin American investment in science and technology is well below 
international standards (Dutrénit and Katz, 2005) . Research on other 
organisations in these countries that do invest in innovation will surely be as 
instructive, and there are studies suggesting similar behaviour in Argentina, for 
example (Marin and Bell, 2006). 
 
However, we would argue that this case from an emerging economy is an example 
where the differing experience from previous studies in Advanced Industrialised 
Countries is instructive and brings new insights to inform the PBO field that has 
become somewhat fixed on a restricted range of country experiences. More studies 
are needed of the variety of circumstances and experiences of the wider world’s 
PBOs.  
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Appendix: Table 1: Adopted innovations 
Innovation record 
title 
Type Number 
of 
adoption
s by 
other 
projects 
Projects 
from the 
same Unit 
Projects from 
another unit 
(geographical
ly distant) 
Adoption 
by external 
contractors 
Controle de Consulta 
Técnica 
M - - - - 
Acesso traseiro para 
manutenção de 
CCM'S - painéis 
auxiliares da 
compressão de gás 
M 1  X  
Documentos técnicos 
de fornecedores 
M 2 X   
Projeto de 
bandejamento 
M 2 X   
Integridade das áreas 
restritas da estrutura 
M 2 X   
Oficina de mecânica 
da plataforma P-51 
M 2 X   
Recebimento do Vaso 
Flotador 
M 2  X  
Estacas Metálicas 
com Cargas Elevadas 
M 1  X  
Análise 
Mercadológica dos 
Tipos de Estacas 
D 1 X   
Negociação com 
órgão ambiental 
D 1 X   
Metodologia para 
documentos de 
Projeto Executivo 
M 2  X  
Tempo de resposta - D 1  X  
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Processo Licitatório 
Interligação dos 
pátios 
D 1 X   
Areia adensada com 
água e vibrador de 
imersão em reaterro 
de áreas confinadas 
D 2 X   
Processos Judiciais - 
proprietários de terra 
D 1 X   
Integração dos 
planejadores - 
consolidação dos 
cronogramas 
D 2 X   
Controle de energias 
Perigosas - EBTV em 
fase de C&M 
D 1 X   
Autorização de 
Subcontratação 
D 2 X   
Sistema de água 
refrigerada nas frentes 
de trabalho 
D 1 X   
Estruturas pré-
moldadas do pipe-
rack 
D - - - X 
Banco de Dados - 
Reunião 
D 1 X   
Bloqueios de Limites 
de Bateria  entre Off-
Site e On-Site 
M 2  X  
Treinamento com 
Simulador Dinâmico 
de Processo 
(Software) 
M 2 X   
Construção de 
undergrounds 
elétricos 
M 1 X   
Procedimento de 
acompanhamento do 
as-built 
M 2  X  
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BAD - Gestão 
Democrática e 
Representativa 
M 3 X   
CCR com temperatura 
interna de 40ºC em 
condição de 
emergência 
M 1  X  
Especificação das 
Bombas API 610 para 
o sistema de Água 
Gelada 
M 1  X  
Sistema de Ventilação 
mecânica das salas 
que operam em 
módulo de 
emergência 
M 1  X  
Documentação para 
preservação na área 
física 
M 1 X   
Diálogos da qualidade 
- uma ferramenta de 
divulgação de 
informações e 
conceitos técnicos 
M 2 X   
Maquetes Eletrônicas 
Walk Through 
D 2 X   
Matriz de Risco - 
Ponto de Vista 
Multidisciplinar e 
Cenário da Obra 
D 3 X   
Manual Técnico de 
Proteções Coletivas 
D 2 X   
Barreira natural 
contra ataque de 
abelhas 
D 2 X   
Arame Tubular - 
Soldagem de 
Tubulação de Aço 
Liga 
D - - - X 
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Sistemática para 
Elaboração de Data 
Book 
D 3 X   
Plataforma para 
cubagem de 
caminhões 
D - - - X 
Gestão de Impactos à 
Biodiversidade Aliada 
à Segurança dos 
Trabalhadores 
D 3 X   
Suportação provisória 
de cabos de solda 
(bandejamento) 
D 1 X   
Inspeções em 
equipamentos locados 
D - - -  
Utilização da 
Ferramenta na 
Prioridade dos 
Sistemas 
D 1 X   
Dispositivo de 
Segurança para 
Movimentação de 
Tampa de Concreto 
D 1 X   
Aquecimento do 
almoxarifado de 
consumíveis de 
soldagem 
D - - - X 
Acesso com uso de 
Passarela 
D - - - X 
Contenção utilizada 
em atividade de 
concretagem 
D - - - X 
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Figure 1: The innovation diffusion process 
 
 
 
 
